Abstract. In this work, we design two-party and multiparty protocols for evaluating multivariate polynomials at participants' inputs with security against a malicious adversary who may corrupt all but one of the parties. Our protocols are round and communication efficient, and use the underlying cryptographic primitives in a black-box way. Our construction achieves optimal communication complexity for degree 2 and 3 polynomials. Our constructions can be used to securely and efficiently realize a wide range of functionalities. For instance, we demonstrate how our techniques lead to efficient protocols for secure linear algebra with security against malicious adversaries. Other applications include secure evaluation of DNF/CNF formulas, and conditional secret reconstruction (or conditional oblivious transfer) for a large family of condition functions.
Introduction
In a secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocol, several parties each with their own private inputs collectively compute a function of their inputs without revealing additional information. Security is defined with respect to an adversary who corrupts a fraction of the parties in order to undermine the correctness of protocol and/or the privacy of honest participants. In this paper we allow the adversary to corrupt all but one of the participants (dishonest majority). A modest security consideration for MPC is to defend against a semi-honest adversary who follows the steps of the protocol but tries to learn more information based on the messages he receives. Semi-honest security, however, is often not sufficient and in many cases does not reflect the scenarios one encounters in real-world. A solution to this problem is to strengthen the definition by requiring security against a malicious adversary who can deviate from the protocol, arbitrarily. While many functions of interest are efficiently realizable in the semi-honest model, the same statement is not true in the malicious model. This motivates the following question for any function of practical importance f :
Is it possible to design an MPC protocol for realizing f with security against malicious adversaries that matches, in efficiency, the best existing constructions in the semi-honest model?
We study the above question where the functions of interest are low-degree multivariate polynomials, or equivalently, constant-depth arithmetic circuits. Many ciphertexts 1 between the parties. This matches the most efficient constructions in the semi-honest model and is essentially optimal. It also significantly improves on the efficiency of the previous constructions in the malicious model (e.g. variants of Yao's protocol) which require O(poly(k)n 3 ) communication in worst case. It is also interesting to note that while we focus on security against malicious adversaries, our protocols are automatically secure against covert adversaries [1] wit lower communication overhead.
We use a Reed-Solomon (RS) code with properly chosen parameters to encode inputs and use an additively homomorphic encryption scheme to send the encrypted encodings to the other party. Each character in the encoding of an input can also be interpreted as a share in a Shamir's secret sharing of the input. Parties use the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme in order to evaluate the multivariate polynomial at each share and compute an encrypted RS encoding of the final output. Then, parties engage in a cut-and-choose process where a random subset of the characters in the codewords for each input and output are revealed. This allows them to verify honest computation for that subset and ensures that with high probability the number of errors in the codeword for the output is small. Thus, parties can unambiguously decode the final output. We also show how to use share packing techniques in order to achieve better amortized efficiency when multiple instances of the protocol are performed.
We prove our protocols secure in the stand-alone model using the idealworld/real-world simulation framework. Nevertheless, many instances of our protocols can be securely run in parallel if the same challenge-verification steps are used for all of them.
On use of homomorphic encryption. As mentioned above we use a semantically secure and additively homomorphic encryption scheme as the main cryptographic primitive in our protocol. However, in addition to being additively homomorphic, we require that the Reed-Solomon encoding and decoding algorithms work properly over the domain of plaintexts defined by the cryptosystem. At first glance this seems to be a rather restrictive assumption. Consider the two widely used additively homomorphic encryption schemes in the literature, i.e. the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) encryption scheme [12] and the Paillier's encryption scheme [27] . The GM encryption works over GF(2) while we need the finite field to have at least k distinct elements for the Reed-Solomon encoding to be meaningful (where k is the security parameter). In case of Paillier's encryption scheme, the domain of plaintexts is not a finite field, and it is no longer obvious whether the Reed-Solomon encoding continues to work.
Nevertheless, we show that both schemes can be adapted to satisfy this additional requirement. First we show a simple way of extending the GM encryption to an additively homomorphic encryption scheme over the extension field GF(2 s ) for any positive integer s. Second, we prove that while the domain of plaintexts in Paillier's scheme is Z N where N is the product of two large and secret primes, the Reed-Solomon encoding and decoding algorithms work correctly over Z N or else the decoding algorithm can be used to factor N . We hope that the observations we make about these schemes can be of further use in other applications that use homomorphic encryption schemes.
Multiparty case. In the multi-party setting, our protocol is based on a recent compiler of Ishai et. al. [18] that combines an outer protocol with security against malicious adversaries (only corrupting a constant fraction of parties) with an inner protocol with security against semi-honest adversaries. We instantiate the inner and outer protocols with black-box constructions that meet our efficiency criteria. We design a constant round protocol with O(poly(c, k)n) communication where c is the number of parties. The protocol uses the underlying primitives in a black-box way. This improves on the existing generic black-box constructions, most notably the construction of [19] for evaluating arithmetic circuits, which require O(poly(c, k)n 3 ) communication in worst case. Due to lack of space, we omit the constructions of the multiparty protocol from this extended abstract and refer the reader to the full version for more details.
Higher degrees. Our protocols (for both two-party and multiparty setting) generalize to higher degree polynomials in a natural way. Particularly, for a degree t multivariate polynomial, we achieve black-box constructions with communication of O(poly(k)n ⌊t/2⌋ ) ciphertexts (linear in k in the two-party case). While this is no longer optimal, it is more efficient that what can be achieved using existing general constructions. We leave it as an open problem to design protocols with security against malicious adversaries for evaluating multivariate polynomials of degree t > 3 with the optimal communication complexity.
Applications. We describe how our constructions lead to the design of efficient secure linear algebra protocols in the malicious model. Other applications we discuss include communication-efficient protocols for secure evaluation of DNF and CNF formulas, and conditional secret reconstruction (or conditional oblivious transfer) for a large family of condition functions. We expect that other useful cryptographic protocols can be efficiently instantiated by protocols for secure evaluation of multivariate polynomials.
Related Work
Cut-and-choose techniques have been used in works such as [23, 29, 22, 13] to boost the security of Yao's garbled circuit protocol [30] from semi-honest adversaries to malicious adversaries. These constructions lead to protocols with communication that is proportional to the circuit size (as opposed to the input size). In contrast, our constructions apply cut-and-choose techniques to algebraic encodings of the inputs and the final output.
Representing functions with low-degree multivariate polynomials has been used by [15, 16] to design round-efficient secure MPC in a different setting. The connection between secret-sharing schemes and error correcting codes has been the subject of study in other cryptography research such as [4] where it is shown how to construct linear secret sharing schemes from random error correcting codes. It is interesting to see if their techniques can be used to design more efficient mechanism for defending against malicious adversaries. A similar usage of Reed-Solomon codes and cut-and-choose techniques was recently and independently used in [5] to design efficient special-purpose secure computation protocols.
Preliminaries
Security Definitions. The security definitions we use to prove our protocols secure follow the ideal-world/real-world simulation paradigm. Roughly speaking, in this framework, a protocol is secure if anything that an adversary can do in the real protocol can be simulated by a simulator in an ideal world where participants send their inputs to a trusted party who performs the computation on their behalf and sends back their corresponding outputs. We do not include the detailed definitions here. Please see [9] for more detail.
Commitment Schemes. We use two types of commitment schemes in our constructions, perfectly binding (com b ) and perfectly hiding (com h ) commitments. Roughly speaking, in a perfectly binding commitment, the committed party cannot alter his commitment even if he has unbounded computational power. Similarly, a commitment scheme is perfectly hiding if an adversary that does not know the decommitment, cannot learn anything about the committed value even with unbounded computational resources. For a vector − → V and a set I, we abuse the notation and use com( − → V ) and com(I) for element-wise commitments to each entry of the vector − → V and the set I respectively. We use a similar notation to commit to a permutation which in this paper is simply represented using a vector of the permuted elements.
Reed-Solomon Codes. We briefly introduce Reed-Solomon codes. 
The next Lemma refers to the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm [28] for decoding Reed-Solomon codes. 
Lemma 1. If number of errors in a code word is less than or equal to
(k − d)/2,
On Using Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
We use a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme that is also additively homomorphic. In particular, we call an encryption scheme E additively homomorphic if given two encryptions E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ), we can efficiently compute an encryption of m 1 + m 2 . We denote this by
This implies that given an encryption E(m) and a value c, we can efficiently compute a random encryption E(cm); we denote this by E(cm) = c × h E(m).
For a vector
− → V we denote by E( − → V ) an entry-wise encryption of the vector. We can encrypt matrices and polynomials in a similar way. We can then add two encrypted vectors (matrices/polynomials) by adding each encrypted component individually. Finally, we assume that a party who knows the randomness and plaintexts for two ciphertexts E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ), can efficiently compute the randomness for
There are a number of homomorphic encryption schemes each with their own special properties. Our protocols work with any encryption scheme that is additively homomorphic and where the domain of plaintexts is either a finite field or a commutative ring where we can assume that with high probability (i) all the values we work with throughout the protocol are invertible and (ii) that the ReedSolomon encoding/decoding algorithms work in the expected way. Next we show that two of the widely used additively homomorphic encryption schemes in the literature, namely the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) encryption scheme [12] and the Paillier's encryption scheme [27] can both be used to implement our protocols. In case of GM encryption we show a simple way of extending it to work over any extension field of GF (2) while preserving its homomorphic properties. For the Paillier's encryption which operates over a ring Z N where N is the product of two large primes, we argue that conditioned on the fact that it is hard to factor N , we can safely assume that with high probability any element in Z N used by our protocols is invertible, and that the Reed-Solomon encoding/decoding algorithms over Z N work in the expected way. We hope that the observations we make here about these two encryption schemes can be of further use in other applications that use additively homomorphic encryption schemes.
Using the Goldwasser-Micali encryption
The GM encryption scheme [12] is a semantically secure scheme based on the quadratic residuosity problem, with the additional property that it is additively homomorphic over GF (2) . Unfortunately, we cannot use the GM encryption directly since for the Reed-Solomon encoding to work we need to do our computation over a finite field with at least k distinct elements where k is the security parameter. Nevertheless, we describe a simple way to extend the homomorphic properties of the GM encryption to any extension field of GF(2). We also emphasize that a similar transformation works for any other encryption scheme that is additively homomorphic over a small-size finite field. Particularly, by considering higher residuosity classes, Benaloh [2] constructs homomorphic encryption schemes over Z p , where p is a polynomially bounded (small) prime number. Our transformation is applicable to his constructions as well.
Let k = 2 s , where we want to perform our computation over the extension
be an irreducible polynomial of degree s with coefficients in GF(2). We define our extension field GF(2 s ) to be the set of all polynomials of degree s − 1 with coefficients in GF (2) . Addition is defined in the natural way to be the normal polynomial addition. In order to multiply two elements in GF(2 s ), we first multiply the two polynomials in the normal way and then reduce the resulting polynomial mod L [x] .
Adding encrypted data in GF(2 s ). In order to encrypt an element in GF(2 s ) we encrypt each coefficient of the corresponding polynomial using the GM encryption. Then, it is easy to add two encrypted elements by performing the coefficient-wise addition of encrypted values over GF (2) . This requires O(s) homomorphic additions of encrypted elements in GF (2) . Multiplying encrypted data in GF(2 s ). It is slightly more subtle to compute E(ab), given a and
be the polynomials of degree s − 1 over GF(2) representing a and b in the extension field. Multiplying the publicly known polynomial A [x] with the encrypted polynomial B[x] is straightforward and can be performed using the homomorphic properties of GM over GF (2) . This results in an encrypted polynomial of degree at most 2s−2 over GF (2) . In order to complete the multiplication operation over GF(2 s ), however, we need to reduce the product polynomial modulo the publicly known irreducible polynomial L [x] . A simple inspection of the synthetic polynomial division reveals that this step can also be reduced to addition and multiplication operations of encrypted elements over GF(2) which can again be performed using the homomorphic properties of the GM encryption (all the multiplications are between one public and one encrypted value in GF (2)). For completeness, we describe a cleaner way to perform the modular polynomial division next.
Let
is a publicly computable polynomial of degree at most s − 1 with coefficients in GF (2) .
if c s+i = 1, and equal to the zero polynomial if c s+i = 0, for
's are publicly known and we know E(c s+i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ s − 1, we can non-interactively compute an encryption of α i [x] for 0 ≤ i ≤ s − 1 using the homomorphic properties of the GM encryption. We then compute an encryption of the final result by homomorphically adding the encrypted α i [x]'s. It is not hard to verify that the above procedure for multiplying an encrypted element in GF(2 s ) with a publicly known one requires at most O(s 2 ) homomorphic additions over GF(2) using the GM encryption scheme. Also note that polynomials u i [x] are computed only once and can be reused for all future homomorphic multiplication operations.
Using the Paillier's encryption scheme
Another option for our protocols is to use the Paillier's cryptosystem [27] . Paillier's encryption is a semantically secure and additively homomorphic encryption scheme based on the decisional composite residuosity assumption. One issue we have to deal with when using the scheme is that the domain of Paillier's cryptosystem is the ring Z N , where N is the product of two large and secret primes. Note that Z N is not a finite field and it is no longer clear whether the elements that the parties encounter in the protocol are invertible or if the Reed-Solomon encoding and decoding algorithms, which are an essential part of our schemes, function properly over Z N . Next, we argue that based on the hardness of factoring N, we can safely assume that working over Z N will not cause any problems.
Inverting elements in Z N . As part of the computation that takes place in our protocols, we need to invert values modulo Z N . For example, this is the case when parties perform the Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm. Hence we need to make sure that these steps can be completed successfully. A simple observation we make is that if during the computation, we encounter a value a that is not invertible mod N , we can use a to efficiently learn a non-trivial factor of N . More specifically, gcd(a, N ) is a non-trivial factor of N . Hence, we can assume that all the intermediate values we encounter during the computation are invertible modulo N .
Validity of Reed-Solomon decoding.
It is a bit more challenging to argue that the Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm works properly and returns the correct answer. The main problem we need to address is that we can no longer assume the crucial property that any polynomial of degree d has at most d roots.
Let N = pq for primes p, q. A non-zero polynomial of degree d with coefficients in Z N has at most d distinct roots modulo Z p and d additional roots modulo Z q . The same polynomial has at most d 2 distinct roots over the ring Z N , where each root over Z N is formed by applying the Chinese Remainder Theorem to a root over Z p and a root over Z q . The following lemma states that even though a polynomial of degree d over Z N might have upto d 2 roots in Z N , knowing more than d of them allows us to factor N .
Lemma 2. Given a set S ⊂ Z N that contains more than d distinct roots of a polynomial of degree
Proof. Let r 1 , ..., r d+1 ∈ Z N be distinct roots of a polynomial over Z N . By the pigeonhole principle, there exists i, j such that r i and r j are the same root of the polynomial over Z p but different roots over Z q . But then the gcd(r i − r j , N ) yields a nontrivial factor of N . By computing the gcd of s i − s j and N for every s i , s j ∈ S, a nontrivial factor of N is found.
⊓ ⊔
We briefly mentioned the Reed-Solomon encoding procedure in section 2. The corresponding decoding algorithm is supposed to perform the following task.
We describe an algorithm that will either find such an f (x), or factor N . N by computing gcd(α i − α j , N ) for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. (ii) If R(X) is identically zero over Z N , then (Y − f (X)) is a factor of Q(X, Y ) over Z N , and so we can factor Q(X, Y ) over Z N to recover f (X). Factoring the multivariate polynomial Q is much easier than the general task of factoring polynomials and can be performed in near linear time.
The above algorithm is guaranteed to find a valid decoding polynomial of the original codeword. But, since we are no longer computing over a finite field it is possible that the computed answer is not unique. Particularly, it might be the case that after factoring Q(X, Y ), there are multiple factors
, where f i (X)'s are valid decodings. It is not clear how to pick the "right" polynomial that contains the output we need in our protocol. Next we show that as long as no (α i − α j ) shares a factor with N for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the valid decoding is unique and hence this will not be an issue. Note that we have control over the choice of α i 's used for the Reed-Solomon codes in our protocols and can make sure that none of the pairwise differences share a factor with N . 
Homomorphic encryption schemes that do not work
Elgamal encryption scheme [7] , is an example of a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption scheme that cannot be used in our construction. There are more powerful homomorphic encryption schemes such as [3] for evaluating 2DNF formulas, and the recent construction of a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme by Gentry [8] . These constructions lead to communication-efficient protocols against semi-honest adversaries. Particularly, polynomials of arbitrary degree can be evaluated securely with the optimal communication of O(n) ciphertext using the latter scheme. However, our techniques for defending against malicious adversaries do not seem to work for these schemes. For example, as mentioned earlier we rely on working over plaintext domains in which Reed-Solomon encoding is meaningful while neither scheme seems to satisfies this property. Moreover, the scheme of [3] can only efficiently decrypt small plaintexts which makes the decryption of random values in a large field difficult. We leave it as an open problem to extend our techniques to encryption schemes with more powerful homomorphic properties.
Secure Evaluation of Degree 3 Multivariate Polynomials
We start with the description of a simple two-party protocol for secure evaluation of a multivariate polynomial of degree at most 3 against semi-honest adversaries.
In what follows, to simplify the composition we assume that the computation takes place over a finite field ., but as discussed in detail in section 3, the computation actually takes place over the domain of plaintexts defined by the encryption scheme (given that the plaintext domain has the properties we discussed earlier). In case of the Paillier's encryption, for instance, the computation takes place over Z N where N is the product of two large primes, while in case of extended GM encryption, the computation takes place over GF(2 s ).
A Protocol Against Semi-honest Adversaries
Parties encrypt their inputs using homomorphic encryption schemes and exchange the encrypted inputs. In order to achieve the best communication efficiency possible, terms of the polynomial being evaluated are split between the two parties based on who owns the majority of the variables in that term 2 . Each party computes the encryption of sum of all terms assigned to him using the homomorphic properties of the encryption. Parties then combine their results to compute the final output. The detailed description follows:
Alice's Inputs: x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ . Bob's Inputs: y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ .
Output: P (X
, where P is a publicly known multivariate polynomial of degree at most 3.
Key generation step:
Alice chooses a key-pair (pka, ska) ← G(1 n ) for a homomorphic encryption scheme Ea. Bob does the same, for an encryption scheme E b .
Alice sends her encrypted inputs to Bob: For every xi, Alice sends Ea(xi)
to Bob. She also generates a random input ra and sends its encryption Ea(ra) to Bob. We skip the proof of security for this above construction since we shortly give a security proof for the more complicated case of malicious adversaries. The protocol runs in constant number of rounds and requires the communication of O(n + m) ciphertexts between the two parties. The computational cost is dominated by O(n+m) encryptions, and O(n+m) homomorphic multiplications (denoted × h ). When measuring the computation complexity in this paper we ignore the multiplication and addition operations when both operands are public since the cost of these operations is dominated by operations on encrypted data.
Bob sends his encrypted inputs to

Defending Against Malicious Adversaries
We modify and enhance the protocol of previous section in order to defend against malicious adversaries. Particularly the new protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and requires the communication of O(k(n + m)) ciphertexts between the two parties where k is a security parameter. Since the protocol is a bit technical and long, we divide its description into four different phases and explain the intuition behind each phase as we go along: (i) Input exchange (ii) Computation (iii) Challenge-verification and (iv) Output retrieval.
Input Exchange Phase. First Alice and Bob setup two encryption schemes E a and E b respectively (step 1). For every input value, each party generates a random polynomial of degree d = O(k) with the only restriction that the input value is the constant term of the polynomial. Parties then encrypt the coefficients of these polynomials using their own encryption schemes and send the encrypted results to each other (steps 2-5). Parties repeat a similar process for a random input, which will be used later to blind the intermediate computation results (similar to the semi-honest case). After receiving the encrypted polynomials, each party uses the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme to compute an encrypted Reed-Solomon encoding of the other parties input values (steps 6, 7). Each character in the encoding of an input can also be interpreted as a share in a secret sharing of the input (Shamir's secret sharing in this case).
Key generation step:
Alice chooses a key-pair (pka, ska) ← G(1 n ) for a homomorphic encryption scheme Ea. Bob does the same, for an encryption scheme E b . We assume that it is possible to verify whether the public key is in a valid range or not. If this is not the case a zero-knowledge proof of this fact must be added to the protocol. Note that it is possible to achieve such a proof through a similar cut-and-choose procedure described next and therefore preserve the black-box use of the encryption scheme. To simplify the presentation of the protocol, however, we eliminate this step. (1)), . . . , E b (Bi(k)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme: Computation phase. Similar to the semi-honest protocol, the terms in the polynomial are split into two disjoint sets, each of which is assigned to one party. In other words the polynomial P = P a + P b where Alice is assigned the terms in P a and Bob is assigned the terms in P b . Parties use the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme in order to evaluate their assigned polynomial at each share of the inputs (steps 8a,8b for Alice). Each party then blinds the encrypted result with his/her random input and commits to the encrypted encoding of the result (step 8c for Alice). These are the vectors − → V a and − → V b . The blinding is performed in order to keep the intermediate results private, since at a later step the commitments are opened. Intuitively, − → V a and − → V b are the Reed-Solomon encodings of the blinded output of evaluating P a and P b at parties inputs, respectively.
Alice performs her portion of computation:
(a) For every term of the form pXrXsXq in P , Alice computes the vector
She adds all such vectors to get a final vector − → V1. Terms of the form pXrXs, pXr and p are computed as special cases of this step where some variables are set to 1.
(b) For every term of the form pXrXsYq in polynomial P , Alice computes the vector
She then adds all such vectors using homomorphic properties of E b to get the encrypted vector E b ( − → V2). Terms of the form pXrYs and pYs are also computed as special cases of this step. (c) Denote the vector ⟨Ra (1) 
Challenge-verification phase. Parties engage in challenge-generation steps (steps 10,12) in order to generate random subsets of size d/2 of K = {1, . . . , k}. The type and order of the commitments (and decomitments) in the challenge-generation steps are important for the simulation proof of security to go through. Also, while it is tempting to use the same challenge subset for both Alice and Bob, it is not clear how to construct the simulator in the proof and prove the resulting protocol secure.
After the challenge subsets are generated, each party reveals the plaintexts and randomness corresponding to shares with indices in the challenge subset, for each input and the intermediate computation results ( − → V a and − → V b ). Parties verify the validity of the openings and ensure that they are consistent with the encrypted encodings of the inputs they computed in an earlier step of the protocol. Roughly speaking, this allows the parties to verify honest encoding and computation for the fraction of the shares opened, and ensures with high probability that the number of errors in the codewords for inputs and the intermediate results are small. During the next and final phase, this allows the parties to unambiguously recover the final output using a decoding algorithm for Reed-Solomon codes. It is important to note that the number of shares to be revealed should be chosen carefully for two reasons: (i) It should be small enough not to leak any information about the actual inputs and (ii) it should be large enough to guarantee that with all but negligible probability, malicious behaviors are caught and that the decoding algorithm successfully computes the final output. 
) is computed honestly for every j ∈ J ∪ J ′ . He will abort the protocol if this is not the case. (e) Alice decodes her output: Alice decrypts the encrypted vector she received in step 16a to get the vector
is the Reed-Solomon encoding of output + ra where output is the final output of the protocol, i.e., polynomial P evaluated at parties' inputs. Alice uses a Reed-Solomon decoding algorithm (see Lemma 1) to unambiguously recover the final result (Note that the degree of the polynomial corresponding to the Reed-Solomon encoding of the output is 3d). 17. Bob receives his output: This is almost identical to Alice's strategy. + n) ) ciphertexts, and uses the underlying primitives in a black-box way, where k is the security parameter.
A detailed proof of security and a more concrete measurement of efficiency is given in the full version of the paper. Letting d = k/5 is sufficient to get the desired level of security. Given that, it is easy to verify the claimed round and communication efficiency. The computational complexity of the protocol is dominated by O(k(m + n) ) encryptions/decryptions and the same number of homomorphic multiplications (again here we ignore operations where both operands are public). Parallel runs of the protocol. While we only prove the protocol secure in the stand-alone model, it is worth pointing out that it is possible to run multiple instances of the protocol in parallel. The only consideration for making the simulation proof go through is to make sure that the same challenge generation steps are used for all instances. Extension to higher degree polynomials. In the full version we show how to naturally extend this protocol to higher degree polynomials. Particularly, for degree t multivariate polynomials in n variables, our protocol requires O(kn ⌊t/2⌋ ) communication.
Multiparty protocols. It is not clear how to extend our two-party protocol to the multiparty case while preserving the important features such as round and communication efficiency and/or the black-box use of the underlying primitives. In the full version, we show a different construction based on a recent construction by Ishai et. al. [18] to design secure multiparty protocols for evaluating multivariate polynomials. The protocol runs in constant round and requires O(poly(c, k)n ⌊t/2⌋ ) communication for degree t multivariate polynomials where c is the number of parties.
Better Amortized Efficiency
Until now, we have focused on the efficiency of a single run of the protocol for evaluating multivariate polynomials. In this section we describe how to securely evaluate a polynomial at multiple inputs with amortized efficiency that is superior to the naive solutions. Consider a multivariate polynomial P of degree t in n variables. We want to design a secure two-party protocol for evaluating P at ℓ different sets of inputs. The straightforward solution is to run the protocol of previous section ℓ times, but this requires the computation and communication of O(ℓkn ⌊t/2⌋ ) ciphertexts. We show how to improve on this by designing a protocol that requires the computation and communication of O((k + ℓ)n ⌊t/2⌋ ) ciphertexts between the parties. One immediate application of this improvement is better efficiency for secure linear algebra protocols as described in the application section.
We take advantage of share packing techniques (originally introduced by Franklin and Yung [6] ) in order to encode a collection of inputs at the cost of (almost) sharing one input. In a share packing scheme, a polynomial is used to encode many secrets as opposed to only one. For example, as a generalization of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, one can share s secrets a 1 , . . . a s by generating a random polynomial S of certain degree with the restriction that
Recall that in our two-party malicious protocol, each input to the protocol is encoded using a polynomial of degree d. When evaluating P on ℓ different inputs, we encode every vector of ℓ values (where each component of the vector belongs to one instance of the protocol) using a single polynomial of degree ℓ + d. Given such an encoding for the inputs, the rest of the protocol proceeds similar to the original protocol, with a few differences in the choice of parameters. At the end of the protocol, the codeword corresponding to the final output contains ℓ useful values, namely the results of evaluating P at each of the ℓ inputs. Parties can retrieve the ℓ outputs by decoding the codeword for the final output. A detailed description of the protocol is given in the full version. The following theorem summarizes our amortized improvement. 
Applications
Our constructions lead to more efficient protocols for a wide range of functionalities such as linear algebra problems, evaluation of CNF and DNF formulas and conditional oblivious transfers. Due to lack of space, we only discuss the secure linear algebra protocols here and refer the reader to the full version of the paper for more details.
Secure Linear Algebra
Efficiency and security of linear algebra protocols have been studied in a series of previous works [26, 21, 24, 19] . Mohassel and Weinreb [24] design protocols with almost optimal efficiency and security against covert adversaries [1] . Ishai et al. [19] extend these results by providing security against malicious adversaries. Our techniques lead to protocols for linear algebra that improve on the efficiency all previous constructions while providing security against malicious adversaries.
In [24] , the authors design secure two-party protocols for different linear algebra problems by reducing the task to the design of a secure matrix product protocol. Particularly, important linear algebra functionalities are securely computed using a protocol that runs in O(s) rounds and performs O(sn 1/s ) secure matrix product protocols where the matrices are n × n. First, note that each matrix multiplication can be interpreted as a protocol for evaluating a collection of multivariate polynomials of degree at most 2 on n 2 variables. Our construction leads to a constant round protocol for this task with O(kn 2 ) communication. Note that our construction is in general more efficient than the recent construction of [19] since the security parameter k is only multiplied with an n 2 term in the asymptotic complexity and only additively effects the larger term in the complexity, namely sn 2+1/s . Hence, for many reasonable choices of s, our protocol is more communication-efficient than all previous constructions with security against malicious adversaries.
